Extreme Right | "Democracy is not a dictatorship of the majority"

The address of the Institute for Right-Wing Extremism (IRex) is not public. Is this a precautionary measure?

Yes. Researchers in the field of right-wing extremism are often subjected to hostility, threats, and sometimes physical attacks. Women are particularly affected. Therefore, we have a number of security measures in place, such as bullet-proof windows, lockable hallways, and an enhanced security plan.

The IRex describes itself as unique in Germany. Why?

Many research centers on right-wing extremism are only loosely affiliated with the university as so-called affiliated institutes or research centers. Our institute is firmly anchored in the faculty and university structure. As a result, higher education law applies, and the ministry cannot simply abolish us. We see it as a privilege and a responsibility to also support other structures that are less funded or operate on a temporary basis.

How did this happen?

Following the NSU murder of police officer Michèle Kiesewetter, two investigative committees were established in the state parliament. The second committee recommended, among other things, the establishment of a documentation center and a research center. We won the competition among state universities with the concept of establishing a permanent university institute with three professorships.

You position yourself in critical right-wing extremism research. What does that mean?

In 2001, social scientists developed the "consensus definition" of right-wing extremism, which is also used by security agencies. However, we want to examine not only this classic right-wing extremism, but also general attitudes such as xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and classism, which are found not only in the hard right spectrum, but also in mainstream society or even in left-wing circles. The goal is to understand how such attitudes become compatible, how normalization processes occur, and how right-wing extremist content is transferred to non-right-wing extremist groups. If one only uses the narrow definition of right-wing extremism, these phenomena remain invisible.

What are you working on right now?

One unique feature is that we work very closely with civil society. We don't just want them to be the recipients of clever academic discourse; we also want to align our research with the needs of civil society. One example is a monitoring project for right-wing extremist activities in Baden-Württemberg, which mainly focuses on things like stickers and graffiti. Unlike in Saxony or Thuringia, for example, where such activities are no longer possible due to the sheer number of attacks, we can create a kind of early warning system that documents where the extreme right is spreading in Baden-Württemberg.

Fortunately, the narrative that right-wing extremism is solely a problem of the East is now outdated. Can research in Baden-Württemberg learn something from the experiences in East Germany?

There are indeed very significant differences: In East German dynamics, broken biographies and socialization in a dictatorship where right-wing extremism was not addressed play a significant role. Mobilization strategies, on the other hand, seem to operate very similarly; this is indeed something we can learn a lot from East Germany. One must not forget that there is a long tradition of extreme right-wing activities, especially in Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria. In the 1960s, the NPD was strong, in the 1990s, the Republicans. These networks still exist, and they are capable of mobilizing: When the "right" people come along, they jump on board.

In one of your research projects, you are looking at the recent elections in Baden-Württemberg.

We analyzed historical datasets dating back to the 1930s, and based on election results, we were able to identify clear strongholds. When events such as acts of violence and assaults are also taken into account, individual regions emerge that exhibit historical similarities with areas like the Ore Mountains. This raises the question: How were mobilizations organized there, and is this pattern being repeated here? The role of youth organizations is striking: The "Young Alternative" was important, as was the "Identitarian Movement." Meanwhile, the "Third Way" is taking over parts of this work. But old structures—skinhead groups and family clans socialized in National Socialism—also play a role. Added to this is the AfD, which provides these milieus with political legitimacy.

What does a political scientist actually say about the fact that the CDU constantly acts contrary to scientific findings that adopting extreme right-wing positions does not weaken the extreme right?

I believe this has little to do with our poor communication of our research findings. Rather, it's a reflection of the CDU's unclear political profile: Does the party want to stand for a modern conservatism à la Angela Merkel? Or should it move toward a radical conservatism, which one would rather describe as reactionary?

One could also counter: The clearer demarcation of recent years hasn't weakened the AfD either. What really helps stop the party's rise?

I don't believe in the disenchantment of power. What we need is a debate about what it means to live in a democracy: A democracy is something different than a dictatorship of the majority; it also involves things like the rule of law and the protection of minorities. Conventional participation opportunities aren't enough for that. We need to go where diverse people come together. In schools, for example. But not to talk to the children, but to talk to the parents. Many more conversations are needed in clubs and companies. This could change the social discourse.